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 
Abstract— We present a multi-layer single-event upset 
mitigation strategy implemented in a low-cost Xilinx Artix-7 
FPGA. The implementation is targeted for a trigger data 
router for the ATLAS muon spectrometer upgrade.  The 
mitigation strategy employs three layers of protection to 
improve overall FPGA design robustness: use of 
triple-modular redundancy for FPGA fabric logic and 
embedded soft-error mitigation in the first layer; further 
enhancement with multi-boot FPGA reconfiguration across 
multiple copies of configuration memory in the second layer; 
and FPGA power cycling and configuration memory 
re-initialization in the third layer. The effectiveness of this 
scheme has been evaluated at two different neutron facilities, 
LANSCE and NCSR “Demokritos”, with 800 MeV and 25 
MeV beam energies, respectively. Testing was performed with 
a similar configuration to that planned for final operation. We 
discuss the testing strategy and summarize the test results to 
estimate the expected data loss over 10 years of operation in 
the ATLAS experiment.  
 
Index Terms—FPGA, radiation effect, single-event upsets 
(SEUs), radiation hardening, Muon Spectrometer, ATLAS 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
HE muon spectrometer forms the outer part of the 
ATLAS detector and is designed to detect charged 
particles exiting the barrel and end-cap calorimeters and to 
measure their momentum in the pseudo-rapidity range |η| < 
2.7. It is also designed to trigger on these particles in the 
region |η| < 2.4 [1]. To benefit from the expected high 
luminosity provided by the Phase-I upgrade of the LHC, the 
first station of the ATLAS muon end-cap system (Small 
Wheel, SW) will be replaced with a “New Small Wheel” 
(NSW) detector which can better handle the increased data 
rates and radiation [2]. For example, the expected raw data 
rate from ATLAS at the current luminosity is up to 1 
petabytes per second, and will increase as luminosity 
increases. ATLAS utilizes an advanced trigger system to 
reduce the data flow to a manageable level, and the trigger 
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path in the NSW will play a critical role in retaining 
excellent muon triggering selectivity under the large 
background at the high luminosity LHC.  
This paper discusses the design of a trigger data packet 
router which is used in the data acquisition system of the 
Small Thin Gap Chambers (sTGC) of the NSW detector. A 
simplified block diagram of the primary trigger path in the 
NSW is shown in Fig.1. In general, it is made up of 
high-speed uplinks for immediate trigger data transmission 
and relatively low-speed downlinks for slow control and 
monitoring. The trigger packet router (Router) in the 
uplinks serves as a fast switch-yard between the front-end 
boards (FEB) and the back-end trigger processor (TP). 
Each router handles a maximum of twelve 4.8 Gb/s 
incoming links from three FEBs, suppresses NULL packets 
and passes over data packets to the TP via four 4.8 Gb/s 
optical links [3-4].  
The high-speed links through the Router handle the 
trigger data flow from several sTGC chambers so the router 
must operate with high reliability to prevent data loss even 
in the presence of radiation effects at the location of the 
NSW detector. In the implementation of the Router, a 
commercial SRAM-based field programmable gate array 
(FPGA) from the Xilinx low-cost Artix-7 family 
(XC7A200TFFG1156) was chosen in favor of a custom 
ASIC. The use of a commercial FPGA offers reduced cost, 
a short development cycle, and design flexibility. However, 
FPGAs are vulnerable to radiation-induced effects and care 
must be taken to mitigate these effects.  
An explicit review of both the radiation-induced effects 
in modern FPGAs and associated mitigation strategies is 
discussed in [5-9]. There are also some studies specifically 
on the Xilinx 7 series FPGAs [10-13] which cover mostly 
the moderate or high performance families: e.g. Kintex or 
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Fig. 1.  Illustration of signal flow of the primary trigger path in the ATLAS 
NSW detector and the role of Router in handling the serial streams. 
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Ultrascale. Relevant applications in the high-energy 
physics experiments can be found in [13-16].  
In this paper, we present a multi-layer SEU mitigation 
strategy to improve the robustness of the Router in the harsh 
environment of the ATLAS NSW detector. This work is 
structured as follows. Section II outlines the radiation 
environment that the Router will be exposed to in the 
ATLAS experiment for the next decade and the primary 
radiation effects expected. Section III covers the 
implementation of the mitigation techniques. Section IV 
presents a test system to evaluate Router performance under 
radiation exposure. Experimental results from two different 
neutron beam facilities are shown in Section V. Discussions 
are given in Section VI and a conclusion is made in Section 
VII. 
II. EXPECTED RADIATION ENVIRONMENT AND EFFECTS  
A. Radiation Levels at the rim of ATLAS NSW detector 
The Router will be located on the outer rim of the NSW 
detector in the ATLAS muon spectrometer. At this location 
there is radiation originating directly from the 
proton-proton interactions as well as secondary radiation 
from activated materials and nuclear interactions 
throughout the detector. The radiation includes high energy 
photons, neutrons, and charged particles.  Due to this 
radiation all commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) components 
on the Router, including the Artix-7 FPGA, must be 
evaluated for radiation tolerance to ensure compliance with 
the ATLAS Radiation Test Criteria (RTC) [17].  The RTC 
document states that radiation tolerance criteria can be 
calculated from the product of the simulated radiation level 
(SRL) listed in Table I and the corresponding safety factors 
(SF) listed in Table II [18]: 
           RTC = SRL  SFsim  SFldr  SFbatch                       (1) 
The safety factors account for simulation uncertainties 
(SFsim), low-dose-rate effects (SFldr), and lot-to-lot variation 
(SFbatch). The numbers in Tab. I are calculated for the NSW 
after 10 years at an LHC luminosity of 5 × 1034 cm-2s-1. 
According to equation (1), the Artix-7 FPGA on the 
Router must tolerate: 16 Gy × 1.5 × 5.0 × 4.0 = 480 Gy (48 
kRad) of total ionizing dose (TID), and a total fluence of: 
1.3 × 1011 ×2.0 × 1.0 × 4.0 = 1.04  1012 p/cm2 for single 
event effects (SEE), over the course of 10 years operation.  
B. Radiation Effects on the Router FPGA 
There are multiple ways that radiation can affect the 
operation of electronics. The damage is normally divided 
into three different categories: TID, displacement damage  
(Non-ionizing Energy Loss: NIEL), and SEE. NIEL effects 
are not considered here as modern CMOS integrated 
circuits are insensitive to displacement damage [17]. 
1) Total Ionizing Dose 
Semiconductors are susceptible to failures due to the 
accumulation of charge over time. Incoming high energy 
photons can cause electron-hole pair generation which 
produces excess free charge if the pairs do not recombine. 
The excess charge can lead to errors in the internal logic, or 
cause changes in threshold voltage or leakage current. The 
amount of radiation dose that a device can tolerate before 
failing to meet published parameter specifications is called 
TID [5].  The Artix-7 FPGA was qualified it up to 550 kRad 
with Co-60 γ source at BNL’s facility [19], which is far 
beyond the required 48 kRad. 
2) Single Event Effects 
In addition to cumulative effects (TID, NIEL), the 
interaction of high-energy particles with electronic 
elements in integrated circuits can cause immediate effects 
that are collectively called “single event effects” (SEE). 
When a high-energy particle passes through the silicon 
substrate of a device, charged particles are created as the 
result of sub-atomic particle collisions. These particles are 
generated by an ionization trail along the path of the 
incoming particle. The major circuit effects from 
high-energy particles include transient current pulses, 
change in memory values (bit flips or SEUs), and latch-ups. 
These effects can be divided into two broad categories: 
recoverable errors (single-event transients, single-event 
upsets, single-event function interrupts) and 
non-recoverable errors (single-event latch-up, single-event 
burnout, single-event gate rupture). For an FPGA, these 
effects can occur in fabric logic elements, configuration 
memory, and internal proprietary control elements. They 
may disrupt proper functionality of FPGA design and lead 
to unexpected behavior of system communication. 
 
TABLE II 
RADIATION SAFETY FACTORS FOR NSW COTS ELECTRONICS  
Safety Factor Type Value Notes 
SFsim 
TID 1.5 
 
NIEL 2.0 
SEE 2.0 
SFldr 
TID 5.0 
COTs, no control for 
low-does-rate effects 
NIEL 1.0  
SEE 1.0  
SFbatch ALL 4.0 
Unknown COTs 
batches 
 
TABLE I 
NSW SIMULATED RADIATION LOADS (SRL)  
Type Inner Rim (R=1m) Outer Rim (R=5m) 
TID (γ) 780 Gy 16 Gy 
NIEL 
(fast neutrons) 2.3 × 1013 n/cm2 7.3 × 1011  n/cm2 
SEE (protons) 
4.2 × 1012 p/cm2 1.3 × 1011  p/cm2 
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Fig. 2. Processing of serial streams inside the FPGA of the router: stage 1 and 7 correspond to the GTP transceivers; stages 2-6 represent the user logic. 
  
III. MULTI-LAYERS SEU MITIGATION ARCHITECTURE 
An illustration of the data flow inside the Router is shown 
in Fig.2 which shows seven stages of the serial signal flow. 
In Stage 1, the twelve lines of 4.8 Gb/s serial stream from 
FEBs are received by the Xilinx GTP receiver (GTP RX). 
The RX groups the data in 20-bit packets which are 
buffered in stage 2 and descrambled in stage 3 to 
reconstruct the original 30-bit packets from the FEB. A 
FEB packet is 30-bits, consisting of a 4-bit header followed 
by a 26-bit payload. There are two header patterns: “1010” 
or “1100” for data and a NULL distinction respectively. 
Headers are used for quick data switching and NULL 
suppression in the Router. The 26-bit payload is scrambled 
on the FEB to keep DC. In Stage 4, NULL packets are 
dropped and data packets are forwarded.  Data packets are 
scrambled again in Stage 5 and assembled in TP packet 
format in Stage 6. Finally, the packets are shifted out via 
four Xilinx GTP transmitters (GTP TX) in Stage 7. In the 
whole signal flow from Stage 1-7: Stage 1 and 7 include 
both hard IP cores (e.g. the GTP transceivers, clock 
managers) and FPGA fabric logic for control and 
initialization; Stage 2-6 are made up of pure fabric logic 
elements. 
A. First Layer: TMR and SEM Controller 
Operations from Stage 1-7 can be corrupted by SEUs 
from different parts of the FPGA, e.g. the hard IP cores, 
fabric logic elements, or configuration memory. In the first 
protection layer, we apply direct SEU mitigation to fabric 
logic elements and configuration memory. The logic 
elements are directly accessible to designers while Xilinx 
offers SEU mitigation tools for the configuration memory. 
SEUs in these two parts also account for most of the SEU 
corruptions in an FPGA design.  Other parts of the FPGA, 
such as the hard IP cores, are either invisible to designers or 
have no associated resources available for direct SEU 
mitigation. SEUs in these parts are handled indirectly in a 
higher layer.  
For critical logic sections that handle control and 
initialization, their design states are protected by triple 
modular redundancy (TMR) [20]. We implemented TMR 
using three voters for the strongest protection. The goal is to 
retain a steady data path from Stage 1-7, while allowing bit 
upsets in the data stream to be recovered using the 
redundancy of data from multiple detector layers.   
Configuration memory are storage elements used to 
configure the function of the design loaded into the device. 
They are physically distributed across the entire device and 
represent the largest number of memory bits in the FPGA. 
Fortunately, configuration memory bits are already 
protected with Error-Correction Code (ECC) and Cyclic 
Redundancy Check (CRC) and only a fraction of these 
memory bits are essential to proper operation. However, 
there is still the possibility that SEUs happen in these 
essential bits and thus change the behavior of the design. 
Accumulated upsets will eventually result in functional 
failures. In the first layer, upsets are addressed by a Soft 
Error Mitigation (SEM) tool from Xilinx [21] which 
monitors the integrity of the configuration memory and can 
fix up to two bits upset simultaneously.  
B. Second Layer: Multi-boot Auto Reconfiguration   
Even with TMR and SEM controls, there is still some 
chance for more than 2-bits to have an upset – a Multi-bit 
upset (MBU), which disrupts the protection in the first 
layer. An MBU can be recovered by reconfiguration via the 
slow control path in Fig.1. However recovery using slow 
control may take several minutes during which the circuit 
may be in an unexpected state or produce incorrect results. 
For the Router operation, this means that there will be some 
time during which the TP will lose trigger information from 
a whole detector sector. To minimize the total time of data 
loss in this case, we implement a second mitigation layer: 
an on-board Multi-boot Auto Reconfiguration (mBAR), 
which utilizes an on-board flash memory to hold the FPGA 
configuration file thus avoiding the need of transmission 
through the slow control path. 
We adapt the same idea as the MultiBoot scheme 
proposed by Xilinx except that there is no golden image in 
the Router on-board flash memory [22]. The flash is based 
on Cypress® 65 nm MirrorBit® Technology with 
Eclipse™ Architecture and it has automatic ECC for single 
bit error correction. Additional TID tests certified that this 
flash can tolerate the accumulated radiation on the Router 
board [19]. 
The mBAR is performed by mapping multiple copies of 
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Fig. 5. Block diagram of Router SEE evaluation system. See text for explanation. 
Router firmware design into the 256Mb Cypress flash. We 
utilized the bitstream compression option from the Xilinx 
FPGA to reduce the size of the configuration file. The 
option works by writing identical configuration frames 
once instead of writing each frame individually. As a result, 
the size of compressed Router firmware is reduced from 
about 78 Mb to around 32 Mb, permitting 6 copies to be 
loaded in the flash memory. A complete firmware reload 
from the flash memory can be done in several seconds, 
compared to several minutes using the slow control system. 
The stored copies in the flash are independent of each other 
and are queued in sequence to be loaded into the FPGA in 
the second layer. Firmware reload via the slow control path 
will be considered only when all copies in the flash are 
corrupted.   
C. Third Layer: Router Power Cycling 
Most the upsets can be addressed in the first two 
protection layers. However, upsets in the SEM controller 
itself, or upsets in internal circuits of the hard IP cores may 
put the IPs in an unknown state that cannot be fixed by the 
protection schemes in the first two layers. These abnormal 
states can be detected by monitoring logic in the FPGA and 
the integrity of Router packets from the TP in Fig.1. The 
backend controller collects any abnormal states of the 
Router using the slow control interface and feedback from 
the associated TP. In the case of constant failures, an 
mBAR will be issued first. If the errors persist, a power 
cycle will be performed. The currents, voltages, and 
temperatures on the Router are monitored via the slow 
control interface. Power cycling will also be applied in case 
of an alarm due to abnormal currents on the Router. In 
summary, this is the last protection layer, and any failures 
cannot be corrected in the prior two layers will be addressed 
here, including non-recoverable SEEs. 
IV. ROUTER SEU TEST SYSTEM  
A. Hardware Implementation   
We evaluated the radiation performance of the Router 
with the test system as shown in Fig.5. The system emulates 
the data flow in the NSW detector and is divided in 4 
sections, as follows:  
1) “FEB emulator”  
A Router handles a maximum of 12 4.8 Gb/s serial 
inputs from three FEBs, and this input data is 
emulated by a Xilinx VC707 evaluation board. The 
serial outputs of the FEB packets are converted by a 
bridge board: converting a High Pin Count (HPC) 
connector from the VC707 to the miniSAS connector 
(HPC-miniSAS); and then transmitted through 3m 
twinax cable to the Router.  The “FEB emulator” was 
placed in the off-beam area. 
2) “Router Prototype” 
The design under test (DUT) is a pre-production 
version of the Router, in which all functionalities are 
implemented. A Router decodes incoming serial 
streams, forwards selected packets to the “TP 
processor” via four optical fibers, and also 
communicates with the “Slow Controller” for control 
and monitoring. In addition, to accommodate the 
Aritx-7 FPGA radiation test, there is a 2-inch clear 
distance from the center of the FPGA to separate 
other active components. The radiation tests were 
performed by aligning the beam towards the center of 
the FPGA to ensure all radiation induced errors are 
sourced from the FPGA itself.  
3)  “TP emulator” 
A custom board was built to emulate the TP 
processor, which checks the integrity of test frames 
from the Router. These packets originate from the 
FEB emulator and arrive at the TP through the 
uplinks. There are four optical channels on the “TP” 
emulator to decode the forwarded packets from the 
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DUT accordingly. “TP emulator” is also in the 
off-beam area. 
4) “Remote Controller” 
A Xilinx KC705 FPGA evaluation board is deployed 
as the remote controller for the whole evaluation 
system. It collects the feedback status from the 
“DUT” and “TP emulator”, and reports this 
monitoring information to a user in the control room 
via dedicated Ethernet link. In addition, the “remote 
controller” also responds to commands from the user 
and distributes control signals like reset, multi-boot 
trigger, power cycling, to associated units. All this is 
done with an embedded micro system (MicroBlaze) 
in the KC705 FPGA.  
B. Software Test Fixture 
A graphical user interface (GUI) was also created for 
automatic control and monitoring of the radiation 
characterization, as in Fig. 5. The GUI was developed via 
the MATLAB GUIDE tool [23]. It communicates with the 
KC705 controller board via TCP/IP server sockets to send 
commands and to read status information. This GUI also 
analyzes any Router SEU failure event in real time 
following the link loss criteria set in the software, as shown 
in Fig. 6. The criteria have three sections, reflecting the 
status of the DUT from two aspects: serial link status (in 
DUT) and the integrity of the payloads (in both DUT and 
TP emulator).  
Serial link status is checked from the reported header 
positions of the Router, which represents the relative 
position of FEB packets in a link from the recovered raw 
packets in Stage 1-2, in Fig.2. Inconsistent values of this 
criteria indicate the loss of synchronization in a link, 
possibly caused by SEUs.  
The payloads are checked at the Router and the TP 
emulator, respectively. The former covers the data 
processing in Stages 1-3 as in Fig.2, as well as the checking 
logic inside Router; while the latter corresponds to that in 
Stages 4-7.  The payload for a complete data packet is made 
up of 104 bits and are grouped into four 30-bit data frames. 
There are pre-assigned increments for every 8 bits of the 
104-bit payload, and its integrity is reflected by the 13-bit 
flags, with bit “0” represents an error in the corresponding 
8-bit group, bit “1” for none error observed. A unique 
identification number (ID) is also assigned for each Router 
and this information is passed over to the TP whenever 
there is no data forwarded to a TX in Stage 7. TP tracks the 
Router ID as part of the data integrity checks.  
In the case that any of the three indicators discussed above 
show persistent errors longer than 5 minutes (a configurable 
value in the GUI), an SEU failure is reported and will add 
up the failure counter by 1. 
The GUI panel also displays other real-time monitoring 
information for the evaluation system: e.g., current 
dissipation versus elapsed time, locking status of FPGA IP 
cores (clock manager, GTP transceiver), serial number of 
bit stream loaded, and accumulated failures. All this 
information is also logged for off-line analysis.  
V. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 
The Router radiation was performed at two different 
neutron facilities: one was at the Los Alamos Neutron 
Science Center (LANSCE), Los Alamos, USA, with the 
beam energy up to 800 MeV; the other was at the National 
Centre of Scientific Research (NSCR) “Demokritos”, 
Greece, with a maximum energy of about 20 MeV. In each 
evaluation, two identical setups were run in parallel for 
cross verification. A comparison of the two beam 
characteristics is shown in Table III.  
 
Fig. 6.  Flow diagram of link loss criteria set in Router SEU test system. 
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Criteria
DUT Header Positions 
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“TP emulator” or DUT 
Data Checker Flag 
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Router ID Change
Router SEU 
Failure Event 
+1
TABLE III 
NEUTRON BEAM CHARACTERISTICS IN NSCR AND LANSCE  
 NSCR LANSCE 
Beam Energy Up to 20 MeV Up to 800 MeV 
Beam Size 
4π 
Collimated in 2 inch 
diameter  
Flux (n/cm2/s) 
3.41× 104- 1.36× 106 1.39 × 106 
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In characterizing the SEU mitigation performance of the 
Router, we define two categories of failures: soft and hard. 
The rate of these failures in the Router were evaluated in 
terms of a cross section (σlink ). Soft failures are those 
recoverable with the mBAR scheme in the second 
protection layer, while hard failures are those requiring a 
power cycling in the third protection layer. The calculation 
of σlink is as σlink = nevents/ (Φfluence × cos(θ)), in which nevents is 
the count of the radiation-induced link breaks during the 
beam time, Φfluence is the fluence during testing beam time, 
θ is the angle of the test fixture relative to the beam (in 
following evaluation θ = 0). 
A. NSCR “Demokritos” Test Results 
The neutron beam at NSCR has a 4π solid angle, thus the 
closer a DUT is to the beam outlet, the higher flux the DUT 
will experience. For the two sets, SET I and II, at the NSCR 
facility, SET I was placed directly at the beam outlet, which 
experienced the highest flux; while SET II was farther away 
to leave space for other test devices according to the beam 
test arrangement. In total, four test cycles were performed 
while increasing the outlet flux from 3.41×104 n/cm2/s to 
1.36×106 n/cm2/s. Corresponding flux for SET II is from 
1.46×104 n/cm2/s to 5.74×104 n/cm2/s. A total of 16 soft 
errors and zero hard error were observed in SET I, whereas 
only one soft error was observed in SET II. Test results are 
summarized in Table IV.  The soft error cross section σlink 
for SET I and II was estimated to be 2.53×10-11 cm2/n and 
1.9×10-10 cm2/n, respectively. No hard failures were 
observed at NSCR. In addition, the flux of RUN 4 is 
comparable with that at LANSCE, and the corresponding 
soft failure cross section was around 3.18×10-10 cm2/n. 
B. LANSCE Facility Test Results  
For the tests at LANCE, the flux of the neutron beam was 
constant at 1.39×106 n/cm2/s and uniform within the 2-inch 
collimated area. Two parallel setups were used and placed 
close together to obtain a similar exposure as shown in the   
picture in Fig.7. Two runs were taken, denoted as RUN 5 
and 6, whose data are shown Table IV. In RUN 5, identical 
checking criteria was used as that at NSCR, and 
calculations shows the soft error cross section is about 
7.15×10-10 cm2/n and 6.93×10-10 cm2/n for SET I and II, 
respectively. Hard failures were first observed at LANSCE, 
and the cross section is on the order of 10-11 cm2/n. Further 
analysis of monitoring logs from the GUI show that the 
three hard failures include 2 failures from the clock 
manager IP cores (e.g. PLL) and one from the SEM 
controller. 
To estimate the final link loss in the detector operation, 
the failure checking criteria in Fig.7 were revised for RUN 
6 and DUT data checking flags were removed. This is 
because only the frames passing from the 12 inputs to the 4 
outputs is of interest in the experiment. As a result, the soft 
failure cross section for SET I and SET II in RUN 6 were 
estimated as 3.68×10-10 cm2/n and 3.43×10-10 cm2/n, 
respectively. The corresponding hard failure cross section 
around 2×10-11 cm2/n. During the whole evaluation, we did 
not observe any other abnormal states in current 
consumption for both setups. 
VI. DISCUSSION 
A. ATLAS NSW Router Data Loss Estimations  
The neutron beam energy spectra at LANSCE is quite 
similar to the neutron background present in the ATLAS 
Liquid Argon (LAr) frontend electronics [24]. Based on the 
relative locations between LAr and NSW detectors in the 
ATLAS experiment, it is expected that LAr experiences 
more radiation than NSW. Since there are no similar 
documents for the NSW detector at this moment, the 
radiation level at the LANSCE facility represents the worst 
case estimation for the NSW Router.  
The Router is a crucial component in the trigger path in 
the NSW detector. Data loss is a direct concern in the 
radiation environment. Data loss is estimated by defining 
the data loss as a percentage (DL%) of abnormal 
interruption time (Tdown) over 10 years of detector operation 
 
 
Fig. 7.  Router SEE Radiation Test at LANSCE 
TABLE IV 
TEST RESULTS FROM NSCR AND LANSCE 
Neutron Beam 
SET I SET II 
Flux 
(n/cm2/s) 
Fluence 
(n/cm2) 
Soft 
Failure 
Hard 
Failure 
Flux 
(n/cm2/s) 
Fluence 
(n/cm2) 
Soft 
Failure 
Hard 
Failure 
NSCR 
RUN 1 3.41×104 1.46×109 0 0 1.46×104 6.25×108 0 0 
RUN 2 3.92×105 1.55×1010 3 0 2.02×104 4.21×108 0 0 
RUN 3 4.98×105 1.80×1010 4 0 5.37×104 1.94×109 0 0 
RUN 4 1.36×106 2.83×1010 9 0 5.74×104 2.27×109 1 0 
LANSCE 
RUN 5 1.39×106 1.30×1011 94 3 1.39×106 1.27×1011 88 2 
RUN 6* 1.39×106 3.15×1011 116 7 1.39×106 3.06×1011 105 6 
   *Note: Checking criteria for RUN 6* at LANSCE was adjusted for final data loss estimation. 
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(3.15 × 108 s). In estimating Tdown, we assume soft failures 
take 8 s to be fixed whereas hard failures require 60 s with 
an additional 300s required for each for failure 
confirmation.  Thus: 
    Tdown ≈  
   [σlink (soft) × (8+300) + σlink (hard) × (60+300)] × Φfluence  (3) 
We used the results in SET I, RUN 6, from the LANSCE 
experiment for the calculation, in which Φfluence ≈1.04  
1012 n/cm2 from Part II.A, σlink (soft)  ≈ 3.68  10-10 cm2, σlink 
(hard)  ≈ 2  10-11 cm2. With these, Tdown ≈ 125366 s. DL% is 
then estimated as: DL%=125366/315360000=0.04%, 
which is acceptable for the NSW trigger electronics. 
B. SEU Cross Section versus Beam Energy  
SEE characterization tests are typically performed with 
mono-energetic proton cyclotron test facilities (e.g., PSI, 
protons up to 230 MeV) or low energy neutron facilities 
(e.g., NSCR, up to 20Mev) [25]. However, the radiation 
environment in the ATLAS experiment is complicated and 
includes radiation from a broad range of particles and 
energies. It is thus necessary to understand the failure 
probability for different particle types and energies. In our 
evaluation, we observed a significant contribution due to 
the neutron beam energy itself. This is reflected by the 
difference in the failure cross section between RUN 4, 
NSCR and RUN 5, LANSCE, in which the soft failure cross 
section of the latter is almost tripled. NSCR and LANSCE 
are both neutron facilities with similar fluxes in our tests. 
With identical setups and checking criteria, the only 
difference is the energy spectra. It is thus evident that the 
results from LANSCE evaluation should be more accurate 
that those from NSCR in estimating the final link loss 
percentage for the ATLAS NSW Router.  
C. Logic Utilization  
A Xilinx Artix-7 FPGA (XC7A200TFFG1156-2) has 
been chosen for the Router implementation. This choice 
was driven by the relatively low cost of the Artix-7 FPGA 
family and by the total number of GTP transceivers 
available in this device. Table V summarizes the logic 
utilization of the FPGA. Less than 20% of the 
programmable logic resources (Slice Register and LUT) are 
used for the Router logic with TMR. In contrast, for 
dedicated resources such as the clocking buffer (BUFG), 
more than 50% is utilized. The Router implementation also 
uses 12 out of 16 GTPs, for the 12 incoming links and 4 
outputs links. Each GTP consists of a RX and a TX for the 
incoming and outgoing links respectively. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The Router in the ATLAS NSW detector plays an 
important role in processing the giga-bit-per-second serial 
links in the trigger chain. It utilizes a commercial Xilinx 
Aritx-7 FPGA for serial link switching which is vulnerable 
to radiation induced effects in the NSW detector 
environment. We presented a multi-layer SEU mitigation 
scheme to protect the FPGA design from radiation effects, 
in which a combination of both circuit level (TMR and 
SEM IP) and  system level (mBAR and power cycling) 
strategies were applied. We built test setups and 
demonstrated the FPGA performance at two different 
neutron facilities. Results show that the scheme is effective 
in mitigating SEUs and keeps the data loss of the Router 
design within acceptable levels. The implementation of the 
mitigation scheme in the Router represents a typical FPGA 
application and could be adapted to enhance the reliability 
of FPGA designs for similar applications in harsh radiation 
environments. 
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